Lost in Diplomacy!

Introduction

“Low-cost distance training courses in peacekeeping.” Doesn’t it sound like a paradox – teaching peace keeping in distance learning! But apparently, that is what most officers at the UNMOGIP (The United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan) headquarters in Srinagar opt for! The UNO offers these courses to its personnel stationed in different parts of the world, and it has found many takers in the UNMOGIP office here in the Kashmir Valley. Not surprising, as since 1972, the UNMOGIP hardly has had any role to play in the Indo-Pak conflict over Kashmir. The result: 44 military observers, supported by 21 international civilian personnel and 46 local civilian staff, all hired for a job that no one knows!

Historical Background

The UN’s love affair with J&K began, among much speculation in 1948 at India’s request. Events preceding the accession of Kashmir to the Indian State saw Pakistani tribesmen along with regular troops invading and plundering the Valley forcing Maharaja Hari Singh, to accede to India and seek its protection. India agreed and the idea was to conduct a plebiscite to ascertain the people’s wishes once the situation normalized, because the peculiar case in Kashmir was, that a Hindu king presided over a dominant Muslim population. Even the leader of the largest political party, Sheikh Abdullah of the National Conference supported the accession to the secular Indian state. (It helped that he was on very good terms with Nehru who wanted Kashmir to have an elected representative, and not a king to head the state, which meant power to National Conference)

Diplomatic Manoeuvres

Post accession, the Indian army was sent to J&K to prevent the Pakistani army backed tribesmen, from taking over the capital. Repeated requests from the Indian side to Pakistan to stop support to the mercenary forces fell on deaf ears, and India decided to take the matter to the UN.  But it is interesting to note that initially, UN was nowhere in the picture, and India had been prepared to cross over into Pakistan to destroy the bases that had been providing support to the mercenaries. This idea was first suggested by Sheikh, but Nehru didn’t want to have a war with Pakistan which could ruin Kashmir and also lead to diversion of forces from Kashmir into Pakistan. It was only when repeated meetings with Pakistan failed to bring out any peaceful solution that Nehru revisited what Sheikh Abdullah had suggested. There is documental evidence to prove that Nehru wanted the Indian army to cross over into Pakistan and wage a war to ensure Kashmir and in turn India’s integrity was protected. Lord Mountbatten, the Governor General, then, alarmed at the prospect of an inter-dominion war within the British Commonwealth broached the idea of UN’s mediation to solve the issue. The exchange between Nehru and Mountbatten and the secret cables that kept Attlee informed in Britain tell us how the British made all efforts then to ensure that India would not be able to carry out its plans militarily. Two points need mention here, one, Nehru throughout these exchanges maintained that India would follow a two-pronged approach, that of requesting the UN to force Pakistan from supplying the tribesmen with military and logistical support, and simultaneously, India would continue to build military plans to invade. The second approach however was successfully thwarted as the Indian army still had British as the army-heads, and Mountbatten had considerable influence in the Defence Committee to ensure that this planning was prevented. Secondly, factors like India’s better military position in Kashmir towards the end of December, 1948 and the reason that India would have a better case at the UNSC if it didn’t militarily invade the country were also used by Mountbatten to convince Nehru.

One must not forget the external factors which might have come into play when Britain decided to side with Pakistan, it was of course in tandem with a strategy to not alienate Islamist countries completely, because in the same year, Palestine had been carved to form the new state of Israel.

Although Nehru is seen as an idealist, his stand on this issue did show glimpses of a realist, who despite pressures wanted no UN influence till the invaders were driven out and maintained that it was under the international law for India to counter-attack Pakistan in its self-defence. The over-rulings by the British and the propaganda to the other UNSC members, specifically the USA ensured that when the case did reach the UN in 1948, it was seen as a bilateral issue and not an aggression from one side.

The UN Resolutions

The UN involvement came in the form of the formation of UNCIP, or the ‘United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan’ which was established by Resolution 39 in 1948. Then, the UN drafted and passed Resolution 47 in April 1948 which called for withdrawal of the tribesmen by Pakistan and that of a phased withdrawal of Indian troops from Kashmir to leave only a minimum to maintain law and order. Both India and Pakistan, of course, did not accept this and in August the same year, UN tried to push the same resolution which India accepted reluctantly and Pakistan rejected. It must be noted that nowhere in these resolutions, was the Instrument of Accession mentioned, since the drafting was done exclusively with Britain ensuring that their image remained pro-Pakistan. The only achievement of UNCIP was the Karachi Agreement drawing a ceasefire line; (the current Line of Control is the same ceasefire line, briefly modified in 1972) and the cessation of hostilities in 1949.

The UNCIP was succeeded by the UNMOGIP, and it failed to conduct a plebiscite in the region due to two reasons,  Pakistan’s insistence on not withdrawing all its forces from the region which was set as a precondition by the August Resolution, and secondly, the disillusionment of India due to the UN’s  failure to condemn the ‘Azad Kashmir’ militia. In fact, India immediately realized its folly in approaching the UN when the Security Council led by Britain didn’t look at the issue in terms of aggression from one side, but more as a conflict where both parties were equal. After this, there was a war fought between India and Pakistan in 1965, UN kept a low profile and just requested both sides by a Resolution to respect the ceasefire line and withdraw their respective forces to their side of the border.

Post 1971 Bangladesh war, the ceasefire line was redrawn with minor changes and at this time, though the UN wanted to monitor it and make its presence felt, India during the Shimla Agreement of 1972, announced that it would like to solve this issue bilaterally only.

UN’s Current Involvement

Since then, though India offers UNMOGIP use of its territory, it has become very clear that it is not interested in any UN-initiated conflict resolutions. Ironically though, as mentioned above, to this day, the UNMOGIP’s headquarters are located in Srinagar and Rawalpindi and it has numerous offices in towns situated along the Line of Control.  People in Srinagar, sadly, still believe that the UN is their only hope, and organize long processions to the UNMOGIP building every time they want to protest about an issue. The UN spends as much as $ 15.80 million per year on infrastructure and personnel, a budget which could be put to much better use. Instead of organizing September 21 International Peace Day Celebrations and many other pompous functions, the UNMOGIP should either shut shop, or work with a smaller local staff on issues like education, health and other soft areas which have always been its forte.

It should also be understood that the mandate of the UN is governed by the veto wielding powers, even the closing of UNMOGIP is a decision which successive secretary generals have left to the Security Council. Boutras Boutras Ghali made a statement that showed that in his experience of holding the highest office of the UN, he had realized the limitations of UN’s powers.

“Unless the two sides approach us, we cannot get involved. If India and Pakistan approach the U.N. on this (Kashmir) issue, it will be ready to help. The best solution lies in direct contact between the two countries. It is said that Boutras Ghali, however did try to remove it from the Council’s list of pending disputes during his tenure. With great difficulty, however, Pakistan managed to retain it on the agenda subject to an annual review. Kofi Annan, his successor also commented in 2001 how the UN Resolutions for Kashmir had not been self-enforcing and thus, unlike Iraq and Timor, effective action couldn’t have been taken without the consent of the two sides. There still are believers who believe that a world body like UN could make a difference and advocate the invoking of the 1948 Resolution, but as Kofi Annan pointed out in a statement in 1997 that the 1948 resolution of the Security Council on Kashmir could not solve the problem since “it has not obviously solved the problem all these years.” It can be seen how UN has taken the role of a mute bystander, and the issue has been phased out of the UN’s agenda as well.

The Present Scenario:  A belated lesson in realism for India

India’s stand of course, has been of polite denial about any interference by a third party in the conflict. Pakistan continues to make lip-service even now about wanting the UN to play a major role. Pakistan’s UN Ambassador Munir Akram noted in 2005, “Six decades have elapsed by since the Kashmiri people were promised the exercise of their right to self-determination by UN Security Council resolutions.” A statement, coming from a country that halted every attempt of the UN to hold a plebiscite for the people of Kashmir! Hurriyat Conference, the third player in the game suffers from severe fickle mindedness. Its leaders can’t make up their minds as to what they want for Kashmir, except that a solution should ‘encompass the 14 million people of Kashmir’ as put by Mirwaiz Farooq, Chairman, Hurriyat Conference. In a way, it shows a faint hope for an independent Kashmir which of course, is impossible today.

We must not forget that by the UN, Pakistan means, involvement of the US. The relationship between these two blossomed during the Cold War, and the US took a special ‘interest’ in the ‘interest’ of Kashmir. However, the position post 9/11 has seen US singing a different tune. The attack at the twin towers has brought to the American foreign policy makers, the realization about Islamic Fundamentalism and existence of terrorist camps. Needless to say, Pakistan is the hotbed of both, and the US needs Pakistan’s cooperation to target these, at the same time, it needs to tread a very careful line to make sure its support to Pakistan, both military and political, doesn’t fall into the wrong hands. It wouldn’t be completely wrong to say that after feeling the wrath of the terrorists, US might have a better understanding of what India has been shouting about for the past one decade. Another factor that has showed a slight tilt towards India is the Indo-US Nuclear Deal which shows that America now considers India, with whom it had a love-hate relationship a more reliable ally than its long term friend, Pakistan.

What does it mean for the Kashmiris?

It doesn’t make much difference unless the governments at both ends take decisive action, indulge in Track-I and II diplomacy and at least ensure that the people have a better living on both sides of the borders even if the conflict is not resolved. Big powers have historically meddled and caused conflicts in the Third World to escalate in their zeal to be helpful, earlier it used to be in the name of the ‘White Man’s Burden’, now it is ‘Operation – Enduring Freedom’ and the ‘Axis of Evil’. Thankfully, India has matured to realize this and is keeping the issue bilateral.

But the distancing of US has effectively brought an end to any action that might have been pushed through the UN. And to be truthful, it is good for the future of the Kashmiri people, to have this issue resolved bilaterally, with more international involvement, it would face more vested interests, and somewhere their cause might just get lost in the mayhem ensued. At least with this, Kashmir doesn’t become a pawn in the power game between India and Pakistan at one level, and the big powers at another.

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